How did Anselm's ontological argument work, and was it accepted?

Philosophy

Researched by the Ignaria Editorial Team · Published 2026-03-12

Anselm of Canterbury argued in the Proslogion (1078) that God, defined as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," must exist in reality as well as in the understanding — for a being that existed only in the understanding could be conceived as greater if it also existed in reality, which would contradict the original definition. This compressed argument has fascinated and divided philosophers ever since: Aquinas rejected it on the grounds that we cannot infer existence from a concept, while Descartes, Leibniz, and many analytic philosophers have defended versions of it. Gaunilo, a monk and contemporary of Anselm, offered the first counter-argument: by the same logic one could prove the existence of a perfect island.

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What the primary sources show

The original statement of the ontological argument: "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" cannot exist only in the understanding, for then something greater could be conceived — namely, the same being existing in reality.

Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, 2–4 (c. 1078 AD)

The immediate counter-argument: if Anselm's logic works for God, it should work for a "most perfect island" — whatever can be conceived as greatest must exist in reality by the same reasoning. Anselm replied that the argument applies only to a being whose non-existence is self-contradictory.

Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, On Behalf of the Fool (c. 1078 AD)

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